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Abstract 
In this contribution I use the Democracy Barometer, a new instrument designed to measure the quality 
of established democracies. This instrument is based upon a broad concept of democracy, embracing 
three principles (freedom, equality, and control) that are ensured by nine functions (individual liberties, 
rule of law, public sphere, competition, mutual constraints, governmental capability, transparency, par-
ticipation, and representation). Measuring the degrees of fulfillment for each of these functions allows for 
cross-country and longitudinal comparisons of the quality of democracy in more than 50 democratic 
governments between 1990 and 2007. Here, I aspire to four goals: first, I present the Democracy Ba-
rometer; second, I describe varieties of democracies in terms of quality; third, I provide a finer grained 
description of the various patterns of both success and crises; and fourth, I attempt to explain the vari-
ous developments. The analyses reveal that (1) a huge variety of democracies exists, in terms of differ-
ent forms and accentuations of the various elements of qualified democracies; (2) there exists neither a 
crisis of democracy, nor any sign of an end to history; (3) modernization theory, human development, 
and institutions can explain the variation in development in terms of the quality of democracy in different 
countries over time. All in all, the Democracy Barometer allows for a very fine-grained analysis of one of 
the most complex phenomenon in political science: democracy.  
(1) INTRODUCTION1  
The diagnosis of the crises of democracy is as old as democracy itself. The idea of the downfall of the 
democratic state has long been a central theme in European political thought. Most often, however, the 
crises theses are based upon short-term observations, political scandals, subjective assessments, or 
even anecdotal experiences. Of course, more optimistic scenarios have also existed, such as the end of 
history thesis following the end of the cold war (Fukuyama, 1992). However, such encomia have typical-
ly been rather short-lived.  
Needless to say, critical thinking is extremely important in the development of science and even of soci-
ety. Thus, the presentiment of crises lies at the very heart of science. It is the clarification of atony that 
helps a system to ameliorate and recover. Periodically, at least, we should look back and compare ac-
tual situations with events of the past. Scientific diagnostics should not rest solely upon single incidents 
but should also carefully examine developments over the long term and foremost base on theoretically 
and empirically well-grounded comparisons.  
To observe and compare the development of democracy, we can apply different tools. Democracy indi-
ces such as Polity (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995), Freedom House (Gastil, 1990), or the Vanhanen’s index of 
democracy, (Vanhanen, 1997, 2000, 2003) can indeed portray the celebrated waves of democracy 
(Huntington, 1991; for a critique of this idea, see Dorenspleet, 2000), that is to say, we can observe that 
the world overall becomes more and more democratic with time. However, a deeper look at established 
democracies using these instruments is not satisfactory. Most Western democracies (according to Polity 
or Freedom House) are perfect democracies. Switzerland or the United States, for instance, score high-
est on Polity, due their existences as nation states and the beginning of their polity measures, respec-
tively (1848 for Switzerland and 1810 for the USA). However, when we consider that female suffrage 
was only introduced in Switzerland in 1971, and realizing that discrimination in terms of suffrage rights in 
the United States was only abolished in 1965, the idea that both countries should be considered to have 
been perfect democracies for centuries is puzzling. The same holds true for Freedom House: in the year 
2001, Berlusconi-Italy is rated with the same maximum value as Persson-Sweden is. Intuitively guess-
ing that the rule of law or quality of press suffers in Italy, whereas political equality has been high in 
Scandinavia during the early years of the 21st century, one would expect that there would be differences 
in an assessment of the quality of these two democracies.  
                                                     
1 The author would like to thank NCCR Democracy at the University of Zurich, sponsored by the Swiss National Science 
Foundation and the Center for Democracy Studies in Aarau, for their grants and financial support. The author is a member of 
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Thus, to measure the development of democracies, an instrument should be utilized that is able to do at 
least two things: first, it should measure the differences between established democracies; second it 
should indicate the development of the quality of a given democracy over time.  
In this article, I present such an instrument: the Democracy Barometer (DB).  The DB was developed to 
respond to the growing number of requests for measurements of the quality of democracy. The question 
no longer is whether a political system can be considered a democracy or not. Instead, rather, democ-
racy research focuses increasingly on the assessment of the quality of established democracies (Altman 
& Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Moreover, the DB attempts to overcome the methodo-
logical and conceptual shortcomings of previous measures (Arndt & Oman, 2006; Bollen & Paxton, 
2000; Hadenius & Teorell, 2005; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).  
In the following section (2), I present the conceptual basis of the DB. Applying this new instrument to 
more than 50 established democracies in a timespan between 1990 and 2007, I first provide an over-
view of the various types of democracies (section 3), and then, in section 4, I examine in greater depth 
the development of the quality of the various nation states. Here, I strive to answer the question of 
whether the pessimist crisis thesis or the more optimistic scenario of a rise in quality prevails, and how 
various developments can be explained. In section 5, I discuss the findings.  
(2) THE DEMOCRACY BAROMETER  
In order to overcome the minimalism of previous democracy measurements, the DB is based on a mid-
dle range concept of democracy, embracing liberal2 as well as participatory3 ideas of democracy (Bühl-
mann et al., 2011). Contrary to most existing democracy measurements, the concept of the DB consists 
of a stringent discussion and stepwise theoretical deduction of the fundamental elements of democracy. 
Beginning with the deduction of three core principles of (liberal and participatory) democracy, nine func-
tions are deduced. The degree of fulfillment of each of these nine functions, which define the quality of 
democracy, are asserted with various components that are themselves measured by different theoreti-
cally deduced subcomponents and indicators.  
                                                     
2 The liberal concept of democracy originates from classical republicanism in its protective version (the most prominent 
representatives of these ideas are Locke or Montesquieu), the classical liberal model of democracy (as defended by Mill, 
Tocqueville or the Federalist Papers), and its more modern developments in the form of the elitist (Weber, 1921) or the 
pluralist models of democracy (Dahl 1956; Fraenkel 1963). One of the most pronounced versions is Schumpeter’s (1950) 
realist model. 
3 The participatory type is rooted in the classical Athenian democracy (Fenske et al., 1994, p. 37), the developmental form of 
classical republicanism (with Rousseau being the most prominent representative), ideas of direct as well as participatory 
democracy (Barber, 1984; Pateman, 1970), and deliberative democracy (Cohen & Fung, 2004; Habermas, 1992; Warren, 
1996). 
THE PRINCIPLES: FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND CONTROL  
We begin with the premise that a democratic system seeks to establish a positive balance between the 
normative, interdependent values of freedom and equality, and that such balance requires control. Con-
trol has an additional value for democracy, because it is the institutionalized checking of the political 
authorities that distinguishes democratic systems from autocratic ones.   
Freedom refers to the absence of heteronomy (Berlin, 2006). Protection and guarantee of individual 
rights under a secure rule of law have become a minimal condition for democratic regimes (Beetham, 
2004). Democracy and the rule of law are even seen as equiprimordial (“gleichursprünglich”; Habermas, 
2001). Only under a secure rule of law, where the state is bound to the effective law and acts according 
to clearly defined prerogatives (Elster, 1988), can individuals be certain that they are protected from 
infringements of their personal freedom by the state. Constitutional individual liberties include the legal 
protection of life, freedom of opinion, and property rights - the threefold meaning of Locke's (1974) term, 
property.  
Additional basic rights integral to democracy are the freedom of association and of opinion, which ena-
ble a lively and active public sphere (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Freedom of opinion, however, depends upon 
the circumstances of information (Sartori, 1987). A free flow of information must be installed and the 
possibility to take part in the public sphere must be ensured. Hence, individual liberties and rule of law, 
as well as an active and legally secured public sphere, guarantee the principle of freedom (Beetham, 
2004). Historically as well as functionally, freedom is strongly associated with the idea of the sovereignty 
of citizens. Indeed, freedom seems only possible where all citizens equally dispose of guaranteed politi-
cal rights (Habermas, 1992). This leads us to the second principle: equality.   
Equality, particularly understood as political equality, implies that all citizens are treated as equals in the 
political process (Dahl, 1956, 1998) and that all citizens have equal access to political power (Saward, 
1998). Thus, the rather abstract principle of equality manifests in a more concrete feature of democratic 
governance: full inclusion of all persons subject to the legislation of a democratic state (Dahl, 1998, p. 
75). There are at least two reasons to regard equality a fundamental principle of democracy. First, in 
modern secular societies, there is no objective basis for valuation on whether the conduct in life of indi-
vidual A is better than that of individual B. Second, no persons are so “definitely better qualified than 
others to govern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of 
the state” (Dahl, 1998, p. 75). Political equality thus aims at the equal formulation, equal consideration, 
and equal inclusion of all citizens’ preferences. Inclusive participation, representation, and transparency 
are required to reach this goal.  
An equal formulation of preferences depends upon participation. As Lijphart (1997, p. 3) states, unequal 
turnout heavily inhibits the quality of a democratic system, because the “privileged voters are favored 
over underprivileged nonvoters.” Thus electoral as well as alternative participation should be as equal 
as possible; the systematic abstention of specific social groups from the political process is seen as a 
disqualification of democratic equality (Teorell et al., 2007). Equality furthermore requires the inclusion 
of preferences of all persons possibly affected by political decisions taken within a democratic regime 
(Dahl, 1998). In representative democracies, inclusion presupposes high descriptive and substantial 
representation. An important prerequisite for equal preference formation and adequate responsive deci-
sion-making is transparency (Stiglitz, 1999). When the freedom of information is restricted and public 
visibility of the political process is not provided, the information mismatch may lead to unequal participa-
tion and, consequently, the unequal inclusion of preferences. 
Although freedom and equality interact and can constrain each other, they are not generally irreconcila-
ble (Talmon, 1960; Tocqueville, 1997 [1835]). Guaranteeing as well as optimizing and balancing free-
dom and equality are the core challenges of any democratic system. In order to maintain a dynamic 
balance between freedom and equality, a further fundamental principle of democratic rule is needed: 
control. Of course, control is not a simple auxiliary for the balance of the two other principles, but is ra-
ther an important basis of democracy itself; control is understood to be a means by which citizens main-
tain the accountability and responsiveness of their representatives. Representative democracy thus 
heavily depends upon a control of power exercised both vertically and horizontally.  
Horizontal control functions as a network of institutions that mutually constrain each other (O’Donnell, 
1994). This network of relatively autonomous institutional surveys, checks, and balances mutually con-
strains the elected authorities. Through mutual constraints, control of the government is not restricted to 
periodic elections but is also complemented by the mutual check and balance of constitutional powers. 
In representative democracies, vertical control is exercised by means of free, fair, and competitive elec-
tions (Manin et al., 1999). It is the elections that allow citizens to decide upon which balance they will 
accept between freedom and equality (Meyer, 2009). Effective elections must be competitive, because 
only competition allows a genuine choice and induces the political elite to act responsively (Bartolini, 
1999, 2000). However, to ensure responsiveness, the results of elections must be effective. Vertical 
control would be polluted if elected representatives were to lack the capability to govern, that is, to im-
plement the electoral mandate. Thus, governments require a certain degree of control over the political 
process, i.e. the capacity to effectively implement collective democratic decisions. Only democratically 
legitimized political decisions or the rule of law may constrain governmental autonomy (Etzioni, 1968). 
 
FROM PRINCIPLES TO FUNCTIONS 
To guarantee and functionally secure freedom, equality, and control, a democratic regime must fulfill 
several functions. These functions are deduced from the three principles (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: The Concept Tree of the Democracy Barometer  
 
 
In a nutshell, we argue that the quality of a given democracy is high when these nine functions are ful-
filled to a high degree. Of course, because of the tension existing between freedom and equality, a sim-
ultaneous maximization of all nine functions is impossible. Democracies are systems whose develop-
ment is perpetually negotiated by political and societal forces. Hence, democracies can weigh and opti-
mize the nine functions differently. However, the degree of fulfillment of each of these nine functions can 
be measured. This requires a further conceptual step: The various functions are based on constitutive 
components. In the stepwise deduction of the concept of democracy, the next step comprises the deri-
vation of these components. Hence, each function is further disaggregated into two components, which 
finally lead to several subcomponents and indicators. In order to account for criticisms of previous 
measures, for each component there are subcomponents to measure legal rules and subcomponents 
measuring the effective constitutional reality. In the following section, I provide a very short description 
of the composition of the nine functions (for an extensive description, see Bühlmann et al., 2011, as well 
as www.democracybarometer.org and the Appendix 1). 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 
The existence and guarantee of individual liberties is the most important prerequisite of democratic self- 
and co-determination. Individual liberties primarily secure the inviolableness of the private sphere. This 
requires the right to physical integrity (Component 1). This component embraces constitutional human 
rights provisions and the ratification of important human rights conventions, which are perceived as an 
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indication of a culture that maintains the effective right to physical integrity (Camp Keith, 2002; O'Don-
nell, 2004). The effective and real protection of this right is mirrored by the fact that there are no trans-
gressions of this right by the state, such as torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatments 
or punishments (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Furthermore, "states are only effective in rights protec-
tion to the extent that citizens themselves are prepared to acknowledge the rights of others" (Beetham, 
2004, p. 72). Thus, a high homicide rate or violent political actions restrict the effectiveness of the right 
to physical integrity.  
The second component comprises a further aspect of individual liberties, which is the right to free con-
duct of life. On the one hand, this encompasses freedom of religion and freedom of movement. On the 
other hand, it requires that property rights be adequately protected. Again, these measures distinguish 
between constitutional provisions guaranteeing the free conduct of life and the effective implementation 
and impact of these rights.   
RULE OF LAW 
Individual liberties and political rights (see below) require protection in accordance with the rule of law 
(Habermas, 1992). Rule of law designates the independence, the primacy, and the absolute warrant of 
and by the law. This requires the same prevalence of rights, as well as formal and procedural justice for 
all individuals (Beetham, 2004; Rawls, 1971). Equality before the law (Component 1) is based on consti-
tutional provisions for the impartiality of the courts. Additionally, the legal framework must be independ-
ent and effectively impartial, that is, it must not be subject to manipulation (O'Donnell, 2004). The quality 
of the legal system (Component 2) depends on the constitutionally mandated professionalism of judges 
(Camp Keith, 2002; La Porta et al., 2004) and on the legitimacy of the judicial system. The justice sys-
tem cannot receive legitimacy by means of elections (like the other two powers). Rather, judicial legiti-
macy is based on the confidence of citizens in the justice system (Bühlmann & Kunz, 2011; Gibson, 
2006) and in the institutions ensuring the monopoly of force.  
PUBLIC SPHERE 
The principle of freedom is completed by the function of the public sphere. Here, individual rights have 
an essential collective purpose: taking part with others in the expression of opinions and seeking to 
persuade and mobilize support are considered important components of freedom (Beetham, 2004, p. 
62). The communication of politics and moral norms occurs in the public sphere (Habermas, 1992); a 
vital civil society and a vivid public sphere are ensured by means of freedom of association (Component 
1) and freedom of opinion (Component 2). Freedom of association must be constitutionally guaranteed. 
Additionally (relying on social capital research), a vital civil society relies on the density of associations 
or unions defending political and public interests (Putnam, 1993; Teorell, 2003; Young, 1999). Formal 
social capital is viewed as a sign of the positive functionality of the free articulation and collection of 
preferences. Freedom of opinion presupposes constitutional guarantees as well. In modern, representa-
tive democracies, opinion making and diffusion within the public sphere is first and foremost concerned 
with media and the media system. Public communication primarily takes place via mass media. Thus, 
media should provide a wide and accessible forum for public discourse (Graber, 2003).  
COMPETITION 
Vertical control of the government is established via free, regular and competitive elections. Bartolini 
(1999, 2000) distinguishes four components of democratic competition, two of which, vulnerability 
(Component 1) and contestability (Component 2), best conform to a middle-range concept of democracy 
and the idea of vertical control (Bartolini, 2000). Vulnerability corresponds to the uncertainty of the elec-
toral outcome (Bartolini, 2000; Elkins, 1974), which is indicated by the closeness of election results as 
well as by the degree of concentration of parliamentary seats. Furthermore, formal rules have an impact 
on vulnerability: district size and the legal possibility of redistricting may influence competition. Contest-
ability refers to the stipulations that electoral competitors have to meet in order to be allowed to enter 
the political race. The effective chance of entering is measured by the effective number of electoral par-
ties, the ratio of parties running for seats to the parties winning seats, and by the existence and the suc-
cess of small parties (Bartolini, 1999; Tavits, 2006). 
MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS 
The horizontal and institutional dimension of control of the government is encompassed by mutual con-
straints of constitutional powers. The balance of powers first depends upon the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature (Component 1). An effective opposition, as well as constitutional provisions 
for mutual checks in terms of possibilities for deposition or dissolution, guarantee the mutual control of 
the first two branches (Ferreres-Comella, 2000). Of course, there must be additional checks of powers 
(Component 2). On the one hand, mutual constraints are completed by the third branch, in the form of 
constitutional jurisdiction, that is, the guaranteed possibility to review the constitutionality of laws. On the 
other hand, federalism is seen as an important means of control. In line with the research on federalism, 
the degree of decentralization, as well as the effective sub-national fiscal autonomy, are incorporated 
into the measure (Schneider, 2003).  
GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY 
One important feature of representative democracy is the chain of responsiveness (Powell, 2004a). 
Citizens' preferences are collected, mobilized, articulated, and aggregated by means of elections, and 
are translated into parliamentary seats. The chain has a further link, namely, responsive implementa-
tion, which requires that policy decisions must accord to initial preferences. A responsive implementa-
tion, however, requires governmental capability, that is, the availability of resources (Component 1) and 
conditions for efficient implementation (Component 2).8 Resources must ensure the effective and impar-
tial implementation of political decisions. Thus, governments must count on high levels of public support 
(Chanley et al., 2000; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). Furthermore, both a wide time horizon in terms of the 
length of the legislature and the stability of the government facilitate more continuous and thus more 
responsive implementation (Harmel & Robertson, 1986). Efficient implementation is more difficult when 
it runs into the opposition of citizens who may attempt to hinder it by means of strikes, demonstrations, 
or even illegitimate anti-governmental action. Contrarily, an efficient bureaucracy can help to facilitate 
implementation.  Furthermore, the policy making process loses its democratic quality when illegitimate 
actors exert influence over it.  
TRANSPARENCY 
Secrecy, or a lack of transparency, will have severe adverse effects on the quality of a democracy: "Se-
crecy provides the fertile ground on which special interests work; secrecy serves to entrench incum-
bents, discourage public participation in democratic processes, and undermine the ability of the press to 
provide an effective check against the abuses of government" (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 14). Opacity is a severe 
danger for equality. Thus, transparency first and foremost means no secrecy (Component 1). Secrecy 
can manifest in the form of corruption and bribery (Stiglitz, 1999), which are considered a proxy for low 
transparency. The unjustified favoritism of particular interests is also linked to rules of party financing. 
The second component measures whether a democracy provides provisions for a transparent political 
process. The availability of information depends upon the guaranteed freedom of information (Islam, 
2006) as well as on the culture of openness, or, the willingness of the government to communicate in a 
transparent way, as well as the informational openness of the media system.  
PARTICIPATION 
In a high-quality democracy, citizens must have equal participation rights: all persons who are affected 
by a political decision should have the right to participate in shaping this decision. This implies that all 
citizens in a state must exercise suffrage rights (Banducci et al., 2004; Paxton et al., 2003). Further-
more, these rights should be used in an equal manner (Teorell, 2006). Equal respect and consideration 
of all interests by the political representatives is only possible if participation is as widespread and as 
equal as possible (Lijphart, 1997; Rueschemeyer, 2004). Unequal turnout in terms of social characteris-
tics or distribution of resources "may mirror social divisions, which in turn can reduce the effectiveness 
of responsive democracy" (Teorell et al., 2007, p. 392). We therefore take the equality of participation 
(Component 1) into account. Of course, the effective use of participation (Component 2) is also im-
portant. Based on the idea that high turnout correlates with equal turnout (Lijphart, 1997), the level of 
electoral as well as non-institutionalised participation is considered. Additionally, the effective use of 
participation can be facilitated or hindered by different rules (for example, voting in advance, or registra-
tion).   
REPRESENTATION 
Democracy means that all citizens must have the possibility of co-determination. In representative de-
mocracies, this is ensured by means of representation agencies. Responsive democracies must ensure 
that all citizens' preferences are adequately represented in elected offices. This is, on the one hand, 
ensured by substantive representation (Component 1). High distortion in terms of high disproportionality 
between votes and seats or in terms of low issue congruence between the representatives and the rep-
resented are signs of an unequal inclusion of preferences (Holden, 2006; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). 
Structural opportunities, such as a large number of parliamentary seats or direct democratic institutions, 
can help to better incorporate preferences into the political system (Powell, 2004b). On the other hand, 
equal consideration of citizens' preferences is ensured by descriptive representation (Component 2), 
first and foremost of minorities. The access to political office for ethnic minorities must not be hindered 
by legal constraints (Banducci et al., 2004). The DB further focuses on women as structural minorities. 
Adequate representation is an important claim for approaches to descriptive representation (Mans-
bridge, 1999; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007). Even after over 100 years of women's suffrage rights, this 
claim should be fulfilled in any established democracy.  
MEASURING THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY 
As discussed in the introduction, not only does a measurement need to adequately specify its concept, 
but it must also face the challenges of measurement and aggregation. The DB is based on the idea that 
the degree of fulfillment of each of the nine functions discussed above can be measured. For this pur-
pose, the components are further divided into subcomponents, which are then measured according to 
several indicators. There is insufficient space to discuss each indicator in this contribution, but it is worth 
noting that the DB consists of a total of 100 indicators, each of which was selected from a large collec-
tion of secondary data (see Appendix). In order to overcome the shortcomings of previous democracy 
measures, the final indicators had to meet several criteria: First, we attempted to avoid indicators that 
were based on expert assessments, because they are quite debatable and not particularly transparent 
(Bollen & Paxton, 2000). We therefore relied as often as possible on ‘objective’ measures, or on the 
construction of indicators from different representative surveys. Second, to reduce measurement errors, 
we attempted to include indicators from a variety of sources for every subcomponent (Kaufmann & 
Kraay, 2008). Third, the DB attempts to avoid 'institutional fallacies' (Abromeit, 2004). Therefore the DB 
is based not only on indicators that measure the existence of constitutional provisions but also on indi-
cators that assess real manifestation. Each component consists of at least one subcomponent measur-
ing rules in law and of one subcomponent measuring rules in use.   
With regard to the aggregation of the indicators, it is necessary to discuss scaling thresholds. For the 
DB, these thresholds were set on the basis of ‘best practice’. This procedure reflects the idea that de-
mocracy should be viewed as a political system that continuously re-defines and alters itself depending 
on ongoing political and societal deliberation (Beetham, 2004). Consequently, each given democracy 
weights the principles and functions differently. We defined a 'blueprint' country sample, which encom-
passes 30 established liberal democracies (all countries that have constantly been rated as full-fledged 
democracies by both the Freedom House as well as the Polity index for the time span of 1995 to 2005).4 
Within this blueprint sample, all indicators were standardized from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating the 
highest value (that is, best practice with regard to the fulfillment of the function) and 0 the worst value 
within the 330 country-years. This blueprint sample is enlarged longitudinally and in terms of the number 
of countries. Thus, it is possible for there to be values below 0 as well as above 100. It is important to 
note that values below 0 do not mean ‘no democracy,’ but simply indicate levels worse than the worst 
established democracy between 1995 and 2005. Accordingly, values above 100 only indicate a com-
paratively better performance.   
The conceptualization of the DB in terms of its different levels of abstraction further requires the defini-
tion of aggregation rules. The first two levels of aggregation – from indicators to subcomponents and 
from subcomponents to components – are based on arithmetic means. In the following steps (compo-
nents to functions, functions to principles, principles to 'Quality of Democracy'), the idea of optimal bal-
ance is implemented: the value of the higher level has been calculated with a formula rewarding high 
values at the lower level, but penalizing incongruence between pairs of values.5 
                                                     
4 These criteria (FH-scores < 1.5 and Polity-scores > 8 for the whole time-span between 1995 and 2005; more than 250’000 
habitants) apply to 34 countries: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Island, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mauritius, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the 
USA. However, Cape Verde, Bahamas, Barbados, and Mauritius are too lacking in data and are therefore sorted out from the 
blueprint sample. Thus, the blueprint sample is composed of 330 country-years. The sample used in this contribution 
embraces 53 countries and a time span of 1990 – 2007. 
5 For measuring variation in the quality of democracy properly, the relationships between principles, functions, components, 
and sub-components have to be translated into aggregation rules, which fit the hierarchical concept of our theory. Our ag-
gregation rule therefore is based on the following six basic assumptions: (1) Equilibrium is regarded as a positive feature. It 
indicates that (at a certain level), the elements of quality of democracy are in balance. Because the assumption of the under-
lying theory is that the best democracy is one in which all elements show a maximum performance, and the worst is one in 
which all elements show a minimum of performance, this is justified. (2) Since we are dealing in the framework of the “blue 
print countries” with democracies, we cannot apply the simple and strict rule of necessary condition. Instead, a modification, 
which allows for compensation of poor quality in one element by better quality in another element, is introduced. (3) Com-
(3) VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACIES 
In the following analyses, we use a sample of 954 country-years (53 countries between 1990 and 2007).  
23 countries were added to the 30 blueprint-countries and the longitudinal dimension was expanded 
from 1995 back to 1990 and from 2005 to 2007. The choice of the 23 additional countries follows the 
logic of the choice of the blueprint countries: we include those countries that (1) score high on Polity as 
well as on Freedom House in the 1990s and (2) have no omissions concerning the 100 basic indica-
tors.6   
One important aim of the DB is the description of various profiles of democracy. We assume that some 
of the nine functions can be seen as trade-offs, rivaling each other to a certain extent. Additionally, we 
expect that different democratic regimes weight the nine functions differently and thus attempt to 
achieve different optima. These different optima, or shapes, of democracy can best be illustrated by 
cobweb diagrams whose axes represent the democratic functions. 
Figure 2 depicts the shape of different country groups according to the mean fulfilment of the nine func-
tions in 1990 and 2007.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
pensation, however, cannot result in full compensation (substitutability). The larger the disequilibrium, the lesser the com-
pensation. Thus, disequilibrium must be punished relative to equilibrium. (4) Punishment for equal degrees of disequilibrium 
should be punished equally, and larger disequilibrium more than smaller disequilibrium. This implies progressive discount the 
larger the disequilibrium. (5) From this, it follows that punishment is disproportional and that the measure does not follow the 
rule of the mean but rather progression. (6) Increase in quality is progressive, but with diminishing marginal returns. We 
assume that, from a certain level on, an increase in quality in one or more elements boosts the quality of democracy, where-
as above a certain quality, increases in quality are smaller. Thus, the measure should be progressive and should consider 
diminishing marginal utility in the increase of quality of democracy when a higher level is reached. In order to achieve pro-
gression, multiplication has been applied. In order to achieve diminished marginal returns, we apply an Arctan function: 
Value of a function = (arctan (component1*component2)*1.2/4000)*80. When there are three elements, we use the mean of 
the pairwise values, i.e.: Value of a principle={[(arctan(component1*component2)*1.2/4000)*80]+ [(arctan(componentc1* 
component3)*1.2/4000)*80]+[(arctan(component2*component3)*1.2/4000)*80]}/3. The formula is more complex when there 
are values below 0. A more detailed description of our aggregation can be found in the methodological handbook at 
www.democracybarometer.org. 
6 The final sample consists of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The calculations for Croa-
tia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia begin with 1992 (that is, the year of the birth of these nations). For 9 indicators 
(Secprop, Fairjust, Memenviron, Devbeh, Givdec, Bribcorr, Transp, Issuecongr, and Publser; see Appendix for explanations), 
we were required to perform imputations for some of the additional countries. The indicators from the same subcomponent 
served as the reference for simple regression imputations. Further countries that also scored highly on Polity and Freedom 
House were excluded due to too many omissions (Bahamas, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New-Guinea, Para-
guay, Taiwan, and Trinidad & Tobago).  
Figure 2: Varieties of democracies  
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 Figure 2 continued 
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Several observations from Figure 2 can be highlighted.  
First, there are indeed very different shapes of democracy in the different country groups.  
Second, comparing the different country groups, not only are there variations in the size of the surface 
but there are also differences in the accent of the different functions. Compared to the mean of all coun-
tries (row 1 in table 2 and a thin black line in all other cobwebs), the group of established democracies 
(that is, Western European democracies together with the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) 
performs best in 1990 as well as in 2007. The bigger surface compared with all countries is first and 
foremost due to better performances in the function of ‘Rule of Law and Transparency.’ Also, the gap 
concerning the function of ‘individual liberties’ seems to diminish over time. This, however, is not due to 
a decrease in this function within the established democracies, but is primarily due to the catching-up of 
all other countries.  
The Eastern European countries show an interesting development in terms of the quality of democracy 
and of the different functions. All in all, the surface becomes larger and more balanced. However this 
improved balance is not simply due to an increase of all functions, but in some cases is even due to a 
decline in certain functions. Most striking are the changes in the functions ‘participation,’ ‘transparency,’ 
and ‘rule of law.’ While the Eastern European countries seem to place a greater emphasis on transpar-
ency, rule of law and participation show a decrease. The phenomenon of declining participation is wide-
ly observed in ex-Sovjet countries and can be explained by decreasing euphoria, or what Inglehart and 
Catterberg (2002, p. 300) called the “post-honeymoon effect.” The data provided by the Democracy 
Barometer suggests that the sharp decline in the rule of law can be traced back to a decline of the effec-
tive independence and impartiality of the judiciary in most of the Eastern European countries.  
Compared to the other country groups, the quality of the Latin American democracies seems to develop 
in parallel to the overall quality. However, this also means that Latin America is not apt to catch up with 
the fulfillment of the various functions. The most striking gaps between Latin America and all countries 
in the sample can be observed concerning the rule of law and transparency. Similarly to the Eastern 
European countries, it is striking that there is a decline in the independence and impartiality of the judi-
ciary. This time, however, this observation cannot be made for all countries. The Latin American group 
reveals itself to be very heterogeneous (see below).  
The two most obvious observations for the six Asian democracies in the sample are the growth in partic-
ipation and the comparatively large and relatively stable gap in terms of representation and transparen-
cy. In fact, only in the Asian group is there no observable decline in terms of the value for the function of 
‘participation.’ This development is not due to an increase in electoral or alternative participation, but is 
first and foremost due to an expansion of suffrage rights and equality of participation. The comparatively 
high difference in the function of ‘representation’ can be explained by the relatively low level of female 
representation in politics. With the exception of Japan, the low values in transparency can be traced 
back to a comparatively high degree of corruption within the political system.    
Third, all in all, in most of the country groups, the shapes became larger. Thus, the overall quality of 
democracy seems to have increased over time in all country groups.  
Of course, the regional means hide the individual country characteristics, that is, the different shapes of 
democracy of the individual countries in the sample. With the Democracy Barometer we can observe 
various developments in the different countries over time. As an example, we depict the cobwebs of the 
country with the highest overall mean of quality of democracy in the sample (Denmark) and the country 
with the lowest overall mean of quality (Venezuela). Additionally, we show the development of the only 
African democracy in the sample, South Africa.  
Figure 3: Cobwebs of selected countries: The quality of democracy in Denmark, Venezuela, and South 
Africa  
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IL: Individual Liberties; RL: Rule of Law; PS: Public Sphere; CO: Competition; MC: Mutual Constraints; GC: Governmental 
Capability; TR: Transparency; PA: Participation; RE: Representation. 
Again, we can observe very different shapes and different emphases in terms of the functions. Most 
striking are the differences between Denmark and Venezuela. While the former performs well in all nine 
functions except the function of ‘public voice’ (which seems to be a problem for all countries), Venezuela 
has very low performances in most of the nine functions. Given its development, it is difficult to consider 
Venezuela in 2007 a democracy. The development is also striking in South Africa. Of course, in 2007 
the only African country in the sample is still far away from the countries with the highest quality. But 
compared to the apartheid-regime in 1990, the developments concerning freedom are striking. Howev-
er, the success of the strongest party, the ANC, seems to have had a negative impact on political com-
petition.  
 
With the cobwebs we begin to see the possibility of illustrating the concept of different accentuations of 
the different functions. The comparison between other countries allows for a better understanding of the 
inherent weaknesses and strengths of various democracies. Another possibility for detecting the nuanc-
es of different varieties of democracies is to examine the higher aggregated values. For instance, we 
can distinguish the countries in the sample according to their weightings of the principles. As argued 
above, I suggest that a country with a high quality of democracy achieves a good balance of the princi-
ples of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality.’ When we look at the overall development of these two principles in the 
investigated time span (1990 to 2007), we can observe that the democratic world has improved in terms 
of freedom and foremost in terms of equality over time (figure 4). Freedom increased between 1990 and 
2000, declined after 2000, and then slowly increased again. One can also observe a growing imbalance 
between freedom and equality.   
Figure 4: The development of freedom and equality (mean of all 53 countries) 
 
Of course, there are very different regional and country-specific patterns that help to explain the overall 
picture. First, the decline of freedom beginning in the year 2000 can be partially explained by the after-
math of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and by the impact of the dotcom-crises. The fight 
against terrorism resulted in restrictions of individual rights in some of the countries listed in the sample. 
The sharpest decline in freedom between the mid 1990s and 2007, however, can be found in Eastern 
Europe. The above-mentioned decline of the function of ‘rule of law’ is the most important explanation 
for this decline.  
When we examine the countries individually, we can distinguish them in terms of the different weights 
they give to the two principles of freedom and equality. Liberal countries place higher value on the prin-
ciple of ‘freedom’ than on the principle of ‘equality,’ whereas egalitarian countries emphasize equality 
more than freedom. In the sample, we can find 14 ‘liberal’ countries (Brazil, Cyprus, Dominican Repub-
lic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Philippines, Switzerland, Turkey, and 
the United States), 29 ‘egalitarian‘ countries (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Swe-
den, and Venezuela), eight countries that changed from being liberal to being egalitarian (Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, New Zealand, Uruguay, Belgium, Croatia, and Thailand) and two countries 
that changed from being egalitarian to being part of the liberal group of countries (Chile and South Afri-
ca). Again, I highlight one particular case. In the UK (Figure 5), we can observe a change in the accen-
tuation of the two principles, coinciding with a change in government. The remarkable shift in the em-
phasis on freedom and equality follows the historical change of government in 1997. While during the 
Major government freedom received a higher weight than equality, there was a slow reversal under the 
Blair government. In this regard, it is important to note that the DB does not use indicators that measure 
the ideological basis of government parties or the party composition of governments.   
Figure 5: The development of freedom and equality in the United Kingdom 
 
 
The growing gap between freedom and equality that can be observed in Figure 4 cannot be found in all 
countries. In fact, in 25 countries, the gap in 2007 is wider than it was in 1990. However, in the remain-
ing 28 countries, the gap decreases. Again, there are certain interesting patterns: the balance between 
freedom and equality is superior in countries with a high quality of democracy in 1990. Thus, well estab-
lished, or high-quality, democracies seem to better succeed at balancing the two principles and also 
have less up- and downturns.  
 
The figures above suggest developments over time. In most cases, this development seems to be posi-
tive, that is, the shapes of the spiders grow larger over time and the values of the principles grow. How-
ever, the development of the quality of democracy over time deserves a deeper investigation and is 
therefore the next topic of this contribution.  
(4) CRISES AND SUCCESS STORIES 
The main question regards the development of the quality of democracy over time: is there a crisis of 
democracy? Or can we observe an ongoing development into an end of history, with perfect democra-
cies all over the world?  
The spiders from section 3 may serve as intuitive description. Comparing the shape of all countries over 
time, we can observe a very small dilatation. However, to investigate the development of the quality of 
democracy, I use the final overall aggregation score provided by the DB (the aggregation of the three 
principles). With this score, I can draw a line that shows the mean development of all countries from 
1990 to 2007 (Figure 6).  
Figure 6: the overall development of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 (mean of all 53 
countries).  
 
 
As suggested from the figures and tables above, the Democracy Barometer demonstrates that there 
has been no reduction of the quality of democracy in the world of established democracies. Thus, we 
can certainly not speak of a worldwide crisis of democracy (at least between 1990 and 2007). However, 
there are two slumps that circumvent a positive linear development between 1994 and 1995, as well as 
between 2000 and 2001. While the downtrend in 1995 is primarily due to a decrease in the principle of 
‘control,’ in 2000, all three principles declined.  
Again, the overall mean development of the 53 countries hides the various developments within the 
individual countries. To analyze these individual developments, I use the mean difference of the overall 
quality score between each pair of subsequent years (1991-1990, 1992-1991, and so forth.). A negative 
mean would indicate a mean decrease in the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007, whereas a 
positive mean indicates an overall increase. Using this simple measure, we obtain the results presented 
in Table 1.  
Table 1: Mean development of the quality of democracy in 53 countries between 1990 and 2007 
(ranked according to the mean difference of the quality of democracy of pairs of subsequent years) 
Country DQ 1990 DQ 2007 Mean Diff Country DQ 1990 DQ 2007 Mean Diff 
Croatia 14.5 41.6 1.81 Malta 57.6 64.2 0.39 
India 7.1 37.3 1.78 Philippines 6.8 13.0 0.36 
Romania 2.3 32.1 1.75 Canada 77.8 83.0 0.31 
Israel 25.2 51.1 1.52 Austria 60.5 65.4 0.29 
South Africa 12.4 37.9 1.50 Iceland 80.7 85.6 0.29 
Colombia 8.3 31.4 1.36 Netherlands 75.6 79.5 0.23 
South Korea 38.6 60.7 1.30 Sweden 80.6 83.7 0.18 
Estonia 45.0 63.5 1.23 Turkey 14.2 16.8 0.15 
Czech Republic 37.7 58.1 1.20 Norway 80.3 82.1 0.11 
Peru 11.3 29.4 1.07 Slovenia 67.6 69.2 0.10 
Switzerland 60.7 77.3 0.98 Finland 85.2 86.7 0.09 
Hungary 45.4 61.6 0.96 Portugal 61.1 62.6 0.09 
New Zealand 57.9 72.3 0.85 Dominican Republic 11.0 12.2 0.07 
Greece 29.9 43.4 0.80 Germany 74.7 75.8 0.07 
Bulgaria 15.1 28.5 0.79 Denmark 87.4 88.4 0.06 
Cyprus 49.2 62.5 0.78 Costa Rica 38.9 39.1 0.01 
Poland 30.3 42.5 0.72 France 46.0 46.0 0.00 
Belgium 74.0 85.4 0.67 Ireland 67.2 66.6 -0.03 
Uruguay 44.6 55.1 0.61 United States 70.0 68.7 -0.08 
Slovakia 26.6 36.2 0.56 Australia 65.6 62.7 -0.18 
United Kingdom 40.9 50.3 0.56 Brazil 39.1 34.4 -0.28 
Spain 58.5 67.7 0.54 Mexico 36.4 29.9 -0.38 
Luxembourg 65.5 74.1 0.50 Argentina 31.4 24.2 -0.42 
Lithuania 27.1 33.9 0.45 Thailand 24.1 16.3 -0.46 
Chile 27.3 34.8 0.44 Venezuela 9.6 1.6 -0.47 
Japan 44.6 51.8 0.42 Italy 61.2 52.2 -0.53 
Latvia 50.0 56.4 0.42 Mean all countries 44.5 52.6 0.48 
DQ 1990: Quality of Democracy Score in 1990 (for Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithunia, and Slovenia in 1992): DQ 2007: Quali-
ty of Democracy Score in 2007 
 
Table 1 depicts several interesting findings.  
First, and most importantly for the purposes of this contribution: in only nine out of the 53 countries was 
the mean overall development of the quality of democracy negative. On average, the quality of democ-
racy declined between 1990 and 2007 in Ireland, the United States, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, 
Thailand, Venezuela, and Italy.  
Second, at the top of the ranking, there are rather young democracies:  eleven out of the 20 countries 
with the strongest mean development ascended to the group of democracies only in the late 1980s or 
early 1990s. When we include South Africa and the Czech Republic as newly established democracies, 
we even have 13 newcomers out of the 20 strongly developing countries. According to age, Switzerland 
and New Zealand are the only established democracies that show a comparatively high mean develop-
ment.  
Third, most countries showing significant positive development began from a low value of quality of 
democracy in 1990. Again, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Belgium are the exceptions in terms of this 
observation. However, some countries showed very low quality scores in 1990 but did not exhibit the 
same strong development: this is the case for Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Thailand, and Venezuela, 
which even lost ground in terms of quality of democracy over time.  
Fourth, there seem to be regional differences. It is striking that four out of the nine countries with de-
creasing quality are Latin American countries, whereas the majority of Eastern European countries 
show considerable increases in quality. Figure 7 indeed shows very different developments in the vari-
ous regions.  
Figure 7: The development of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 in different country 
groups.  
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The group of the established democracies slowly, but quite regularly, enhances the overall quality of 
democracy. The Eastern European countries demonstrated a great deal of progress at the beginning of 
the 1990s. This jump can be explained by the rapid change of socialist regimes to democratic systems. 
A closer look at this change reveals that it can be explained by a large improvement in the principle of 
freedom (in terms of individual liberties, rule of law, and public voice, i.e. the expansion of the press 
system). In the following years, the quality of democracy grew very slowly. The impressing development 
of the quality of democracy in the early 1990s within the Asian countries ceased in 1997 (probably due 
to the Asian economic crises) and has not resumed. The Latin American countries showed the weakest 
development over time. The decline in 1995 can partly be traced to the economic crisis in Mexico (‘el 
error de diciembre), which led to a sharp decline of governmental capability primarily in terms of a de-
cline of confidence.  
These observations lead to the search for determinants that could explain the variations in development. 
Of course, there are several single and country specific explanations (see three examples in Figure 8): 
the change from the discriminating apartheid system to a liberal democracy in South Africa from 1989 to 
1994 partially explains the development in this country. The progress of Switzerland is to a signficant 
degree due to the total revision of the Swiss constitution in 1999. The reform of the electoral system 
seems to be one important determinant of the positive development of New Zealand: In 1994, the ma-
joritarian system was changed into a more proportional voting system. This system change seemed to 
have a large impact on the functions of ‘Representation’ and ‘Competition.’  
Figure 8 The increase of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 in three single countries.  
 
 
Not only increases but also decreases can at least partially be explained by single events (Figure 9). In 
the United States, one can observe a positive development between 1991 and 2000; however, after 
2001, the quality of democracy declined. This change in 2001 may be due to the change in government 
(from Clinton to Bush), the terror attacks in 2001 (which impacted the decline in the function of ‘Individu-
al Liberties’) or to the dotcom crisis in 2000. The decline in Venezuela since 1998 seems to correlate 
with the rising to power of the ‘Movimiento Quinta República,’ and the up and downs in Italy are quite 
parallel to various changes in government. In this respect, it is important to again note that no indicator 
within the DB captures the party or ideological composition of governments. 
Figure 9 The decrease of the quality of democracy between 1990 and 2007 in three specific countries.  
 
 
However, to explain the various developments of the quality of democracy in the different countries, we 
should also investigate more general patterns. The question is, whether there are determinants that can 
explain the increases and decreases, as well as the differences between the countries, over time. From 
the observations above, and based on the literature, three groups of explanatory factors can be de-
duced: it is argued that (1) economy drives democracy, (2) that democracy is a result of human devel-
opment, and (3) that different political institutions allow for greater or lesser development of quality of 
democracy. In the following, these three contentions are very briefly discussed. 
ECONOMY DRIVES DEMOCRACY 
The modernization theory (see Przeworsky & Limongi, 1997), argues that a country’s economic well-
being positively contributes to its regime quality: the wealthier a country is, the more likely it is to devel-
op a high quality of regime (Li & Reuveny, 2003; Muller, 1988). Lipset (1959) already argued that distri-
butional conflicts are lower at higher income levels. Furthermore, one of the inherent promises of de-
mocracy is the more equal distribution of income. With prosperity, distribution is easier, but only when 
the citizens demand better distribution. Of course, such claims are more enforceable in well-functioning 
democracies (Dahl, 1989). Economic development helps distribute political authority and democratic 
aspirations (Burkhart & Lewis Beck, 1994). Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that the stability of a 
democracy depends upon its economic structure: first, the better a capitalist democracy works, the more 
it is based on trust and the more difficult it would be to topple a democratic regime. However, as Muller 
(1995) reminds us, to foster democracy, economic growth must go hand-in-hand with improved equality 
of income distribution. When there are only few people benefitting from economic well-being, protests 
are likely, as is a deprivation of support for democracy and hence a decline of the quality of democracy.   
Linked to this idea is a further determinant of democratization that is widely discussed: globaliziation. In 
the literature, we can find two competing suggestions regarding the relationship between globalization 
(economic globalization in terms of enlargement of global economic markets) and democracy (Li & Reu-
veny, 2003). First, according to the argument made by Muller (1995), it is argued that globalization ob-
structs democracy: the reduction of the autonomy of a national government and decisions that please 
foreign investors comes at a cost to citizens. Consequently, the level of democracy declines. Further-
more, it is argued that globalization enhances the gap between winners and losers (Kriesi et al., 2007), 
which can be seen a further negative impact on the quality of democracy. However, globalization is also 
seen as an important factor in the promotion of democracy: By reducing information costs (Diamond, 
1992), by enlarging the scope of action for nation states (Gilpin, 1987; O’Riain, 2000), by expanding the 
electoral marketplace through denationalization (Sassen, 1996), or by dispersing ideas for advancing 
democracy (Ohmae, 1990), globalization accelerate democratization.  
Linked to both the argument concerning wealth and that concerning globalization is a third economic 
determinant of the quality of democracy: economic crises. “Economic crisis represents one of the most 
common threats to democratic stability" (Diamond & Linz, 1989, p. 17). Linz (1978) argues that econom-
ic crises bring the danger that incumbent governments will be unable to solve certain critical problems 
and that this may produce legitimacy crises. The decline of citizens’ confidence in the government can 
lead to the support of opposition parties that are sympathetic to more authoritarian solutions to address 
crises (also see the initial work of O’Donnell, 1973). Of course, this idea was widely challenged 
(Gasiorowski, 1995) because the relation between economic crises and crises of democracy is seen as 
being influenced by many other factors, such as cultural, historical, or institutional determinants.  
Given the data from the Democracy Barometer, I test the following hypothesis:  
The wealthier a country is, the higher is its quality of democracy. The more globalized a country is, the 
higher is its quality of democracy. The less a country is affected by economic crises, the higher is its 
quality of democracy.    
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
A second prominent discussion in the literature on democracy and democratization is the human devel-
opment thesis. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005) state, human development goes hand-in-hand with the 
democratic quality of a given regime. A high quality of democracy is more probable in countries where 
the quality of life is high and access to education is readily available to all inhabitants. Socio-economic 
development (improving health and life expectancy and rising levels of education) are seen as important 
prerequisites for the development of democratic values among citizens (Jackman & Miller, 1998; Muller 
and Seligson, 1994; Rustow, 1970). These civic values “put political elites under popular pressure to 
institutionalize democratic rules and to keep these rules effective” (Welzel et al., 2003, p. 344; also see 
Gibson & Duch, 1994). Of course, and again, these ideas are challenged. While it seems evident that 
human development and democracy are related, the direction of the causality is not clear (Dahl, 1998). 
Countries with low education levels, health problems, and a low life expectancy, are normally not de-
mocracies (Anand & Sen, 2000). However, the question is whether human development fosters democ-
ratization or whether human development only becomes possible thanks to democratization.  In this 
contribution, I compare established democracies to certain qualities of democracy. Thus, I do not test 
the impact of socio-economic resources on the process of democratization, but rather examine different 
levels of the qualities of democracies. I therefore test the following hypothesis:  
The higher the level of human development in a country, the higher is the quality of democracy in that 
country.  
INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH  
The discussion of institutional influence on democratization and the quality of democracy hinges upon 
two main institutions: the electoral and the political system, that is, a proportional vs. majoritarian elec-
toral system and a parliamentary vs. presidential system. In a nutshell: “institutional features that pro-
mote stability and compromise are widely thought to facilitate the persistence of democracy” 
(Gasiorowski, 1995, p. 883).  
Based on the investigations of Lijphart (1977, 1999), it is argued that more consensual democracies are 
better democracies. For this contribution, I do not include all of the variables Lijphart used to measure 
the degree of consociational democracies. Rather, I concentrate on the most important institutional one, 
which is the electoral system. Lijphart (1999) argues that proportional electoral systems (PR) have ad-
vantages over majoritarian electoral systems because they allow for power sharing and therefore the 
inclusion of all (important) political interests and preferences. PR reduces the barriers for smaller parties 
representing the interests of minorities (Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Norris, 2008), as each party receives a 
number of seats in proportion to its votes. Due to the greater number of (minority) parties, PR has an 
additional feature that strengthens power sharing: it fosters the probability of large government coali-
tions, or “executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 34). Due to its inclusive 
capacities, power sharing leads to more political (that is, diffuse, which is the term used by Easton, 
1965, 1975) support even for minorities (Bühlmann & Hänni, 2010) and thus to a higher stability of de-
mocracy, resulting from better inclusion and thereby a higher quality of democracy. Of course, there are 
challenges to the idea of the potential of PR for inclusion. PR not only encourages the inclusion of mi-
norities, but also of small parties that might try to exclude other (for instance ethnic) minorities or veto 
consensual decisions (Norris, 2008).   
The second institution assumed to influence democratization in terms of stability and compromise and, 
hence, also the quality of democracy, is the parliamentary system.  In his initial study on parliamentary 
vs. presidential systems, Linz (1990, p. 52; also see Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Samuels & Shugart, 
2001) arrives at the conclusion that “parliamentarism generally offers a better hope for preserving de-
mocracy.” He argues that parliamentarism provides better protection against ruptures due to policy 
changes. Furthermore, such policy changes are much better incorporated by parliamentary systems 
than they are by “rigid” presidential systems. Most important is the assumption that the winner-takes-all 
concept of the presidential system leads to a suppression of opposition and minority preferences, 
whereas in parliamentary systems, power-sharing and coalition formation helps to arrive at common 
solutions. Thus, it is suggested that parliamentary systems are more inclusive, more representative, 
more responsive, and more accountable (that is, more equal in terms of the DB) and that they should 
lead to a better quality of democracy than presidential systems. I conclude:  
The quality of democracy is higher in parliamentary systems and in countries with PR electoral systems 
than it is in presidential systems and in countries with majoritarian systems.  
METHOD AND DATA 
The most common research design to test the above hypotheses, that is, for a cross-country compari-
son over time, is a time series cross-sectional or panel data analysis (PDA). However, for this study of 
the relationship between economy, human development and institutions, and the quality of democracy 
and globalization, I use multilevel analysis (MLA), a method recently being discussed as a promising 
alternative for PDA (Shor et al., 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen & Bühlmann, 2008). The idea of using MLA 
for time series cross-sectional data is based on the treatment of observations over time as nested within 
units (in this case, countries), supposing that the development of the quality of democracy over time 
(level 1) differs from country to country (level 2).7  
The advantages of MLA compared to PDA are better estimation in the case of a low number of observa-
tions, better model fit, and, first and foremost, higher flexibility in terms of estimating the effects of time-
                                                     
7 The standard model takes the following form: Yij = β0j+βXij+αWj+µ0j+εij: The quality of democracy in country j at time i 
can be explained by an overall mean (β0j), time-dependent variables (the X variables and their respective β; e.g. the eco-
nomic variables or the HDI), time-independent country properties (the W variables and their respective α; e.g. the institution-
al variables j), country variation (µ0j with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between-country variance of σµ2), and time 
variation (εij with an assumed mean of 0 and a total within-country variance of σ2). The overall variation (σµ2+ σ2) is 
divided into differences at the time level (level 1 variance), which are explained by time-dependent variables, and differences 
between countries (level 2 variance). For a more detailed discussion of MLA, I refer to the relevant literature (Jones, 1997; 
Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
invariant variables (in our case: institutions) and the possibility for estimating cross-level interactions 
(Shor et al., 2007; Stadelmann-Steffen & Bühlmann, 2008). Of course, multilevel analysis also has its 
weaknesses. First, as with PDA, we must check for the problem of non-stationarity of the data. The 
discussion of the development of the quality of democracy in the previous section, as well as some sta-
tistical tests for unit-root, show that the dependent variable does not suffer from non-stationarity. Se-
cond, autocorrelation of the residuals must be corrected for. In my models I used difference matrixes for 
the independent variables (see Rasbash et al., 2009: p. 71-76).8 Finally, the number of cases (primarily 
the number of observations) is rather low. Therefore, the results must be interpreted with care. 
The hypotheses deduced above are measured with the data described in Table 2. Of course, besides 
the three types of explanatory factors, there are other important determinants of the quality of democra-
cy. I therefore include several controls in the models. First, it is argued that the development of the 
quality of democracy is also culturally determined. I control for the assumption that Protestantism fosters 
democratization. Protestantism is suggested to be more conducive to democracy because tolerance, 
trust, egalitarianism (or the willingness for compromise), all of which are cultural preconditions of de-
mocracies, are assumed to be more prevalent in Protestantism than in other religions (Bollen, 1979; 
Huntington, 1984).  
Second, I include the size of a country measured by its population. The impact of size on the quality of 
democracy is extensively discussed in political philosophy (for an overview, see Dahl & Tufte, 1974). 
Most authors suggest a negative connection between size and quality. The greater the number of citi-
zens living in a country, the greater is the probability that there are many different interests, which are 
difficult to represent. Furthermore, political interest, political confidence, generalized trust, and the will-
ingness to participate, which are important pre-determinants for a high quality of democracy, are as-
sumed to be higher in smaller units.   
Third, and finally, I control for the age of the democracy. Two educated guesses are made in political 
theory concerning the relationship between the quality and the stability of democracy. On the one hand, 
it is suggested that aged democratic systems consistently lose the support and political confidence of 
their citizens and therefore show a downward trend in quality. On the other hand, it is assumed that 
young democracies are not stable and risk a loss of quality when required to face political and economic 
challenges. 
 
                                                     
8
 The covariance between two measurements at year i1 and i2 on country j takes the form: cov (ei1j, ei2j)=α*(1/|ti1j-ti2j|), 
and the autocorrelation is then cor (ei1j, ei2j)=(α*(1/|ti1j-ti2j|))/σe2. For |ti1j-ti2j| we can build difference matrixes. α must 
then be estimated to correct for the autocorrelation.  
 
Table 2: Measures  
Variable Operationalization Hypothesis Source 
Economy    
 GDP Gross Domestic Product at purchasing 
power parity per capita.  
The higher GDP, the higher 
the quality of democracy.  
IMF World Eco-
nomic Outlook 
Database 
 Globalization Indicator combining flows (Trade, FDI, 
PI and income payments) and re-
strictions (Import Barriers, Tariff rate, 
Trade taxes, account restrictions) 
The greater economic open-
ness, the higher is the quality 
of democracy.  
KOF Swiss Eco-
nomic Institute 
(Dreher 2006; 
Dreher et al. 2008) 
 Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices 
(Annual percent change; average con-
sumer prices (Index, 2000=100).) 
The higher inflation, the lower 
is the quality.  
IMF World Eco-
nomic Outlook 
Database 
Human Development    
 HDI Human Development Index, combining 
data on life expectancy, education and 
per-capita GNI.  
The higher the human devel-
opment, the higher is the 
quality of democracy.  
Human develop-
ment reports 
(several volumes).  
Institutions    
 PR System Dummy indicating whether in a country 
there is a proportional electoral system 
(1) or not (0).  
The quality of democracy is 
higher in countries with a PR 
system.  
Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) 
 Presidential 
 System 
Dummy indicating whether a country 
has a presidential system (1) or a par-
liamentary system (0).  
The quality of democracy is 
higher in countries with a 
parliamentary system. 
Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) 
Controls    
 Age of democ-
 racy 
2006-year of birth of a democracy.  The older a democracy is, the 
higher is its quality.  
Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) 
 Population Number of inhabitants of a country for 
each year.  
The bigger a country is, the 
lower is its quality of democ-
racy.  
IMF World Eco-
nomic Outlook 
Database. 
 Protestantism Number of protestants as a share of all 
inhabitants.  
The higher the share of 
protestants in a country is, the 
higher is the quality of democ-
racy.  
CIA World 
Factbook 
 
RESULTS  
I attempt to first give answers regarding my hypothesis in a stepwise procedure. First, in an empty mod-
el, I examine whether there is variance in the development of the quality of democracy between coun-
tries and over time (model 1 in Table 3). Second, I test for the impact of the different determinants of the 
three approaches (models 2 to 7 in Table 3). Third, I check the robustness of these impacts by including 
the control variables (models 8 and 9 in Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of the quality of democracy, empirical results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
FIXED EFFECTS          
Constant 50.4 (3.0)** 45.1 (2.8)** 34.9 (3.2)** 50.4 (3.0)** 20.6 (3.5)** 51.5 (3.5)** 57.3 (3.4)** 36.0 (4.4)** 25.7 (4.7)** 
Economy          
 GDP - 26.7 (2.9)** - - - - - 7.0 (3.9)* 7.0 (3.9)* 
 Globalization - - 20.8 (1.6)** - - - - 12.2 (2.8)** 12.6 (2.8)** 
 Inflation - - - -11.8 (4.7)* - - - -3.1 (4.5) - 
Human Development          
 HDI - - - - 38.9 (3.3)** - - 14.4 (6.1)* 12.6 (6.1)* 
Institutions          
 PR System - - - - - 5.6 (8.1) - - - 
 Presidential System 
- - - - - - -20.5 
(5.8)** 
-16.3 
(4.8)** 
-11.9 
(4.4)** 
Controls          
 Age of democracy - - - - - - -  13.1 (8.9) 
 Population 
- - - - - - -  21.6 
(10.8)* 
 Protestantism - - - - - - -  22.4 (7.0)** 
RANDOM EFFECTS          
Time-Level (
2σ ) 30.5 (1.4)** 28.3 (1.3)** 25.6 (1.2)** 30.3 (1.4)** 27.2 (1.3)** 30.5 (1.4)** 30.5 (1.4)** 26.5 (1.3)** 26.2 (1.2)** 
Country-Level (
2
0µσ ) 
491.1 
(95.7)** 
386.6 
(75.2)** 
457.8 
(89.2)** 
489.0 
(95.3)** 
307.1 
(59.8)** 
496.0 
(96.6)** 
403.2 
(78.6)** 
274.7 
(63.6)** 
217.6 
(42.2)** 
MODEL PROPERTIES          
Number of Timepoints (Countries)  944 (53) 944 (35) 944 (35) 944 (35) 944 (35) 944 (35) 944 (35) 944 (35) 944 (35) 
-2loglikelihood 6204.2 6123.5 6044.8 6197.8 6076.6 6203.7 6192.7 6042.4 6019.7 
Note: Not standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets; all independent variables were rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 indicated the highest value of the 
variable. Coefficients indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. All models were calculated with MLwiN, restricted maximum likelihood estimations.* significant at the 
90% level; ** significant at the 99% level.  
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The first model in Table 3 depicts the empty model. One can observe that there is indeed significant 
variance between countries (level 2) as well as within countries, across time (level 1). While approxi-
mately 6% of the overall variance can be attributed to variation in development of the quality of democ-
racy within the countries, 94% of the variance is due to cross-country differences.  
In the following models, 2 to 6, I try to explain these variances. In terms of the economic variables, we 
can see that wealth (measured with GDP), as well as the degree of economic globalization, have a posi-
tive impact on the quality of democracy. At first glance, economic crisis seems to have the assumed 
negative impact. However, controlling for other factors, this effect disappears (see model 8). Thus, the 
results seem to support the ‘modernization theory.’ Furthermore, globalization seems not to do harm, 
but rather to promote the quality of democracy.  
In model 5, I test for the impact of human development: as suggested, the HDI has a positive impact on 
the quality of democracy, even when I control for other variables. Basic socio-economic conditions in 
terms of health, education, and income not only foster democratization, but also seem to encourage the 
development of the quality of democracy.  
In models 6 and 7, one can observe that institutions matter in terms of the quality of democracy. How-
ever, while the electoral system does not have the suggested effect, parliamentarism indeed seems to 
perform significantly better than presidentialism does. Again, this impact persists even under control.  
To summarize: the development of economic well-being and of economic globalization, as well as of 
human development as measured by the HDI, indeed seems to correlate more or less in parallel with 
the development of the quality of a given democratic country. These impacts also hold when I control for 
further determinants (models 8 and 9). It is important to note that these variables measure the develop-
ment over time, that is, they explain the level1-variance. As for the institutional variables, they explain 
the differences of the development of the quality of democracy between countries. While presidentialism 
seems to have the assumed negative impact on the quality of democracy, even when I control for other 
factors, PR loses its positive effect. Thus, in parliamentary systems the quality of democracy develops 
more efficiently than in presidential systems.  
There are some noteworthy impacts of the control variables. First, in the sample of 53 democracies, the 
age of democracy seems to not play a role. Of course, the impact is positive and only slightly below the 
significance level of 90%. However, this could be taken as a sign that the old established democracies 
lose their advance. Second, population has a positive impact. Contrary to my assumption, the quality of 
a democracy grows more efficiently in larger sized countries than it does in small countries. A positive 
development of the quality of democracy is therefore not just possible in small and homogeneous coun-
tries. Third, Protestantism has quite a significant impact: the protestant culture highlighting interpersonal 
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trust, equality, and the search for compromise seems indeed to foster the development of the qualities 
of democracy.  
All in all, the results more or less confirm previous findings discussed in the democratization literature. It 
seems that economy, human development, and parliamentarism not only help nations to become de-
mocracies, but also to become even better democracies.  
(5) DISCUSSION 
In this contribution, I sought to describe and explain varieties of democracies as well as differences in 
terms of the developments of the various qualities of democracy in 53 different democratic nations be-
tween 1990 and 2007. The investigations were based on a new instrument, the Democracy Barometer, 
a complex measuring tool that is able to assess the subtle differences in the qualities of various estab-
lished democracies. With this instrument at hand, I first demonstrated that there is indeed a wide variety 
of democracies. Different countries give different weights to the nine functions assumed to be important 
and necessary conditions for the quality of democracy. We can distinguish not only geographical pat-
terns, but also different developments over time, not only considering the forms of democracies as illus-
trated by the cobwebs, but also considering the different weightings of the principles of freedom and 
equality.  
Analyzing the overall quality of democracy, that is, the overall aggregation of the functions and princi-
ples of the Democracy Barometer, I showed that – at least between 1990 and 2007 – there is neither 
reason to assume a crisis nor a glorious prosperity of democracy. In the time span of the investigation, 
only nine out of the 53 democracies showed a (non-linear) decline of quality over time. In the remaining 
45 countries, I found a (non-linear) positive development in terms of the quality of democracy.  
I then attempted to explain these various developments using widely used determinants of the democra-
tization research. In a nutshell: the results are in line with the findings of previous investigations in de-
mocratization. However, contrary to previous studies of democratization, I neither tested for the devel-
opment of autocracies into democracies nor for democratic stability, but I did test for the quality of de-
mocracy. In this sense, the findings are quite surprising, as they challenge the widespread view that 
once a country has become a democracy, neither economics nor human development can foster its 
further development. The results show that this is not the case. To the contrary, I argue that democrati-
zation is a never-ending process and that even established and old democracies can improve in quality. 
The results demonstrate that positive development depends upon economic factors as well as on hu-
man development: growing wealth, improved health, and improved education all help to improve the 
quality of democracy. Furthermore, improvement of the quality of democracy seems to work more effi-
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ciently in parliamentary systems than in presidential systems. The above-discussed gap between Latin 
American countries and the other democracies in the sample seems to be most convincingly explained 
by this institutional difference. 
However, these findings still remain on a very highly aggregated level. With the Democracy Barometer it 
is possible to take a deeper look at the complexity of the development of democracy. When we examine 
the impact of the variables from model 9 in Table 3 on the nine different functions, we can observe 
some interesting differences. I provide two examples (the models can be found in Appendix 2): the posi-
tive and significant impact of the GDP can be observed for freedom and equality but not for control. The 
same holds true for globalization. However, economic openness has an even more complex influence 
on democracy: The more open an economy is, the higher are the values for the functions of ‘individual 
liberties,’ ‘public sphere,’ ‘mutual constraints,’ ‘transparency,’ and ‘representation.’ However, the higher 
the globalization index is, the lower is the value for the function of ‘participation.’ Could this be a sign not 
only of the positive impact of globalization on the spread of democratic ideas and institutions but also of 
the negative impact on political support, or the citizens’ perception of the loss of the efficacy of their own 
votes? These very simple models show that democracy and its development is much more complex 
than can be evaluated with a single indicator. Thus, closer investigation is required and the Democracy 
Barometer can help to provide deeper insight into the connection between different determinants and 
the development of democracy. The stepwise construction of the Democracy Barometer allows at least 
a cautious approach towards a more thorough examination.  
Of course, one could object that I investigated only a very short time span in this research. It could be 
argued that democracy was much better before 1990, or that the financial crisis of 2009/2010 was the 
main breaking point, and that we can observe occurrences all over the world even in the most estab-
lished democracies that show a crisis of democracy (the violent demonstrations in Germany (Stuttgart 
21), and the failure of government in Belgium, for example). Given the results of this contribution, I 
would argue against such an objection. First, there are always incidents around the world that show that 
democratization and the development of the quality of democracy is not, and cannot be, a linear pro-
cess. Second, the comparisons in this contribution show that there are very different developments in 
different regions and countries. However, even when there are ups and downs, the overall picture is a 
very optimistic one. Of course, democratization in terms of the improvement of the quality of democracy 
is (and must remain) a never-ending process. The discussion on the forms of democracy, that is, the 
weighting of the different functions, must be the result of an ongoing political and societal discussion 
accompanied by critical social science. The Democracy Barometer can help to structure this discussion. 
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APPENDIX 1: CONCEPT TREES, COMPONENTS, SUBCOMPONENTS, INDICATORS, SOURCES 
 
 
The colors in the conceptual trees have the following meanings:  
dark blue: Overall quality of democracy score (QOD) 
mint: principles 
light blue: functions 
yellow: components 
orange: subcomponents measuring effective impact (rules in use) 
pink: subcomponents measuring constitutional settings (rules in law) 
green: indicators 
 
For detailed information about the indicators and their sources, please refer to the codebook (available at www.democracybarometer.org). 
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QUALITY OF 
DEMOCRA-
CY 
FREEDOM EQUALITY CONTROL 
Competition 
 
Mutual Cons-
traints 
Governmental 
Capability  
Individual  
Liberties 
 
Rule of Law 
 
Public Sphere Transparency Participation Represen-
tation 
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1 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 
1.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES [INDLIB] 
Right to physical integrity [IL_PHIN] Right to free conduct of life [IL_SELFU] 
Consttort 
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of 
conduct of life [IL_SELFU1] 
Convtort 
 
Freedom of conduct of life [IL_SELFU2] 
 
Freerelig 
 
Constrel 
Freemove 
 
 
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing physical 
integrity [IL_PHIN1] 
No transgressions by the state [IL_PHIN2] 
 
Torture 
Politterr 
 
Mutual acceptance of right to physical integrity by 
citizens [IL_PHIN3] 
 
Homicide 
Riot 
Constfreemov 
 
Effective property rights [IL_SELFU3] 
 
Propright 
 
 
Secprop 
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1.2 INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Right to physi-
cal integrity 
Constitutional provi-
sions guaranteeing 
physical integrity  
Consttort Existence of constitutional provisions banning torture or inhumane treatment. DAP 
Convtort Ratification of Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment. 
HDR 
No transgressions by 
the state 
Politterr Political Terror Scale; degree of political terror by government. PTS 
Torture Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment. CIRI 
Mutual acceptance of 
right to physical integ-
rity by citizens 
Homicide Number of homicides per 100'000 capita (multiplied with -1). EUROSTAT, 
WHO, PHO, UNO 
Riot Number of violent demonstrations or clashes of more than 100 citizens involving 
the use of physical force (multiplied with -1). 
Banks 
Right to free 
conduct of life 
Constitutional provi-
sions guaranteeing 
right to freedom of 
conduct of life 
Constrel Existence of constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom. DAP 
Constfreemov Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of movement. Div. constitutions 
Freedom of conduct 
of life 
Freerelig Extent to which the freedom of citizens to exercise and practice their religious 
beliefs is subject to actual government restrictions. 0 = government restricted 
some religious practices; 1 =  no restrictions. 
CIRI 
Freemove Citizens’ freedom to travel within their own country and to leave and return to 
that country. 0 = restricted in a given year; 1 = generally unrestricted. 
CIRI 
Effective property 
rights 
Propright Measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights 
and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. 
HF 
Secprop Personal security and private property are adequately protected. IMD  
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2 RULE OF LAW 
2.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
 
RULE OF LAW 
[RULEOFLAW] 
Equality before the law 
[RL_EQL] 
Constitutional provi-
sions for impartial 
courts [RL_EQL1] 
 
Constitutional provi-
sions for judi-cial pro-
fessionalism 
[RL_QUAL1] 
Profjudge 
Proftenure 
Constfair 
 
Quality of the legal 
system [RL_QUAL] 
Judindepcor 
Effective independence 
of the judiciary 
[RL_EQL2]  
 
Judindepinf 
Confidence in the 
justice system 
[RL_QUAL2] 
 
Confjust 
 
Pubtrial 
 
Confidence in the police 
[RL_QUAL3] 
Confpolice 
Fairpolice 
Effective impartiality of 
the legal system 
[RL_EQL3] 
 
Impcourts 
 
 
Integrlegal 
 
 
Fairjust 
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2.2 RULE OF LAW: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Equality before the 
law 
Constitutional provi-
sions for impartial 
courts 
Constfair Constitutional provisions for fair organization of the court system (no excep-
tional courts and hierarchical judicial system). 
DAP 
Pubtrial Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public trial. DAP 
Effective independ-
ence of the judiciary 
Judindepcor Level of independence of the judiciary (no inside corruption or outside influ-
ence). 
AHR 
Judindepinf Level of independence of the judiciary from political influences of members of 
government, citizens, or firms. 
WEF 
Effective impartialilty 
of the legal system 
Impcourts Legal framework is not inefficient and subject to manipulation. WEF  
Intgrlegal Integrity of the legal system. Fraser 
Quality of the legal 
system 
Constitutional provi-
sions for judicial 
professionalism 
Profjudge Professionalism (law degree, professional experience) is a precondition for 
appointment of judges to highest courts.  
Kritzer 
Proftenure Professionality of judges concerning length of tenure. Professionality is high, 
if tenure is not constricted, i.e. it it is lifelong.  
Kritzer 
Confidence in the 
justice system 
Confjust Share of citizens with confidence in the legal system. WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Fairjust Assessment of the confidence in the fair administration of justice in the socie-
ty. 
IMD 
Confidence in the 
police 
Confpolice Share of citizens with confidence in the police. WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Fairpolice Assessment of reliability/effectiveness of the police services WEF  
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3 PUBLIC SPHERE 
3.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
PUBLIC SPHERE [PUBLIC] 
Freedom to associate [PS_FRAS] Freedom of opinion [PS_FROP] 
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom 
to associate [PS_FRAS1] 
Degree of association (economic interests) 
[PS_FRAS2] 
Constfras 
Media offer [PS_FROP2] 
Constspeech 
Constpress 
Union Newsimp 
Newspaper 
Balpress 
Political neutrality of the press system 
[PS_FROP3] 
Degree of association (public interest) 
[PS_FRAS3] 
Memhuman 
Memenviron 
Constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom 
of speech [PS_FROP1] 
Neutrnp 
Memproorg 
Constass 
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3.2 PUBLIC SPHERE: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Freedom to 
associate 
Constitutional provi-
sions guaranteeing 
freedom to associate 
Constfras Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of association. DAP 
Constass Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of assembly. DAP 
Degree of association 
(economic interests) 
Union Trade union density. ILO 
Memproorg Membership in professional organizations (share of respondents). WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Degree of association 
(public interests) 
Memhuman 
 
Membership in humanitarian organizations (share of respondents). WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Memenviron 
 
Membership in environmental/animal rights organizations (share of respond-
ents). 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Freedom of 
opinion  
Freedom of speech 
 
Constspeech Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of speech. DAP 
Constpress Existence of constitutional provisions guaranteeing freedom of press. DAP 
Media offer Newsimp Import of newspapers, journals and periodicals as a % of GDP. CD, OECD 
Newspaper Number of daily newspapers per 1 million inhabitants. WPT 
Political neutrality of 
press system 
Balpress Ideological balance of the press system. BPHW 
Neutrnp Share of neutral / independent newspapers’ circulation. BPHW 
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4 COMPETITION 
4.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
COMPETITION [COMPET] 
Vulnerability (Competitiveness of elections) 
[CO_COMP] 
Contestability (Openness of elections) 
[CO_OPEN] 
Low legal hurdles for entry [CO_OPEN1] 
Closeness of electoral outcomes [CO_COMP2] 
Formal rules for competitiveness [CO_COMP1] 
Adminhurd 
 
Legthresh 
 
Meandistrict 
 
Gerryman 
 
Largepavo 
Votediff 
Effective contestation [CO_OPEN2] 
 
Smallpavo 
Nuparties 
Low concentration of seats [CO_COMP3] 
 
Herfindex 
 
Seatdiff 
 
Effective entry [CO_OPEN3] 
 
Enep 
 
Effparrat 
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4.2 COMPETITION: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Vulnerability 
(Competitiveness 
of elections) 
Formal rules for 
competitiveness 
Meandistrict Mean district magnitude Keefer 
Gerryman Possibilities to delimit electoral districts; categories: 3 = no possibility; 2 = body responsi-
ble for drawing the boundaries is NOT executive or legislative; 1 = legislative is responsi-
ble for drawing the boundaries; 0 = executive is responsible for drawing the boundaries.  
ACE 
Closeness of 
electoral out-
comes 
Largpavo Margin of electoral concentration of votes; Comp = 100% - pstrongest, where pstrongest = 
percentage of votes obtained by strongest party. 
ACEA, AED, 
EEA, IPU, WZB. 
Votediff 100-Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all votes. ACEA, AED, 
EEA, IPU, WZB. 
Low concentra-
tion of seats  
Herfindex Herfindahl index: the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in parliament. 
Measures the degree of concentration (mutliplied with -1). 
Keefer 
Seatdiff 100-Difference between largest and second largest lower house party in % of all seats. ACEA, AED, 
EEA, IPU, WZB. 
Contestability 
(Openness of 
elections) 
Low legal hur-
dles for entry 
Adminhurd Low administrative hurdles to become a competitor. Bischoff, Hug, 
ACE, IPU,  Bow-
ler et al., CoE, 
Tavits, 
Elklit/Reynolds  
Legthresh No or low legal electoral threshold; 100 – legal threshold; when no legal threshold = 100  Keefer; Norris 
Effective con-
testation 
Smallpavo  Chance for small parties to win a seat: share of votes of smallest party in national parlia-
ment (multiplied with -1).  
WZB, IPU, 
Psephos, ACEA, 
AED, EEA, IPU, 
WZB. 
Nuparties Number of important parties (>1% of votes) running for elections.  WZB, IPU, 
Psephos, ACEA, 
AED, EEA, IPU, 
WZB. 
Effective entry Enep Effective number of parties at the electoral level.  Gallagher 
Effparrat Ratio of effective number of parties at the parliamentary level and the effective number of 
parties at the electoral level.  
Gallagher 
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5 MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS 
5.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
[MUTUCONS] 
Executive-legislature relation-
ship [MC_EXLERE] 
Checks between executive 
and legislative powers 
[MC_EXLERE1] 
Additional checks of powers 
[MC_ACHE] 
Degree of Federalism 
[MC_ACHE1] 
Federgeta 
 
Controlex 
 
Balance between executive 
and legislative powers 
[MC_EXLERE2] 
Balpowexle 
Subnational fiscal autonomy 
[MC_ACHE3] 
Seatsgov 
 
Subexp Judrev 
Controlle Powjudi 
Judicial Review  
[MC_ACHE2] 
 
Subrev Nonunitar 
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5.2 MUTUAL CONSTRAINTS: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Executive-
legislature rela-
tionship 
Checks between 
executive and legisla-
tive powers 
Controlle Possibility for executive branch for veto power over laws passed by the legisla-
ture and for dissolving the legislature. 
IAEP 
Controlex Possibility for legislative branch to remove executive from office (instruments 
such as vote of no confidence / impeachment as well as difficulty to proceed).  
IPU, Ismayr  
Balance between 
executive and legisla-
tive powers 
Balpowexle Balance of powers (opposition vs. government) according to Altman/Perez-
Liñan 2002. 
ACEA, AED, 
EEA, IPU, WZB. 
Seatsgov 100- Proportion of parliamentary seats belonging to governing parties. ACEA, AED, 
EEA, IPU, WZB. 
Additional 
checks of pow-
ers 
 
Judicial review Judrev The extent to which judges (either Supreme Court or constitutional court) have 
the power to review the constitutionality of laws in a given country (from 2: full 
review of constitutionality of laws; 1: limited review of constitutionality; 0 no re-
view.  
La Porta et al.  
Powjudi Power of judiciary. Possibility to control political decisions. DAP 
 
Degree of Federalism 
Ferdergeta Federalism index as developed by Geering-Thacker (6 - unitarism); 1 = unitari-
an state; 5 = strong federal state 
GETA 
Nonunitar Average of Nonfederalism and Nonbicameralism (2-unitar);  
 
QOG 
Subnational fiscal 
autonomy 
Subexp Subnational expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures WB / IMF(GFS) 
Subrev Subnational revenues as a percentage of GDP WB / IMF(GFS) 
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6 GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY  
6.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
GOVERNMENTAL 
CAPABILITY 
[GOVCAP] 
Government resources 
[GC_GORE] 
No interference 
[GC_CEIM2] 
MipRip 
No anti-government 
action [GC_CEIM1] 
 
Antigovact 
 
Conditions for efficient 
implementation 
[GC_CEIM] 
Violantigov 
 
Time horizon for action 
[GC_GORE1] 
Confgov 
Devbehav 
 
Public support 
[GC_GORE1] 
Legislen 
 
Publser 
Governmental stability 
[GC_GORE2] 
 
 
Govstab 
 
Cabchange 
 
Govterm 
 
Administrative asserti-
veness [GC_CEIM3] 
Govdec 
 
Bureau 
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6.2 GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITY: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Government re-
sources 
Time horizon for 
action 
Legislen Length of legislative period (if no given rule in constitution the maximum 
length is taken.  
Con 
Govterm Length of government term.  CIA 
Public support 
 
Confgov Share of citizens with high confidence in the government.  WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Devbehav Share of citizens which do not endorse behavior and attitudes that are di-
rected against the democratic society.   
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Governmental stabil-
ity 
 
 
Govstab  Stability of government; A cabinet is seen as stable if it is able to stay in gov-
ernment during the whole legislation. 
IPU, WZB 
Cabchange Number of major cabinet changes (multiplied with -1). Banks 
Conditions for effi-
cient implementation  
No anti-government 
action 
 
Antigovact Legitimate anti-government action (such as strikes aimed at national govern-
ment policies or authority or peaceful gatherings for the primary purpose of 
displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority; mul-
tiplied by -1). 
Banks 
Violantigov  Illegitimate anti-government action (such as armed activity, sabotage, or 
bombings carried out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and 
aimed at the overthrow of the present regime or iIllegal or forced change in 
the top government elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or 
unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government; multiplied by -1). 
Banks 
No interference MipRip No political interference by military and religion.  ICRG 
Publser Independence of public service of political interference. IMD 
Administrative asser-
tiveness 
 
Govdec Government decisions are effectively implemented. IMD  
Bureau Bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic chang-
es in policy or interruptions in government services. 
ICRG 
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7 TRANSPARENCY 
7.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
TRANSPARENCY 
[TRANSPAR] 
Provisions for transparent 
political process 
[TR_PTPP] 
RestricFOI 
 
Informational openness 
[TR_PTPP2] 
No secrecy [TR_NOSEC] 
Freedom of information 
[TR_PTPP1] 
 
 
Disclosure of party 
financing [TR_NOSEC1] 
Discinco Legmedia 
Polmedia 
 
Absence of corruption 
[TR_NOSEC2] 
 
Bribcorr 
 
Willingness for transpar-
ent communication 
[TR_PTPP3] 
Transp 
 
CPI 
 
EffFOI 
 
Discexp 
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7.2 TRANSPARENCY: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
No secrecy Disclosure of party 
financing 
Discinco Existence of provision for disclosure of income by political parties. ACE, Casas-
Zamora, IDEA-F, 
ODG, Toplak 
Discexp Existence of provision for public disclosure of expenditure by political parties.  
 
ACE, Casas-
Zamora, IDEA-F, 
ODG, Toplak. 
Absence of corruption Bribcorr Assessment of the prevalence of bribery and corruption.  IMD 
CPI Corruption Perception Index, ranging from 0 (high) to 10 (low) and measuring 
the overall extent of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the public 
and political sectors. 
TI 
Provisions for 
transparent 
political process 
Freedom of infor-
mation 
RestricFOI Restriction of freedom of information / barriers for access to official information. Banisar, Tromp  
EffFOI Effectiveness of Freedom of Information laws. Banisar, Tromp  
Willingness for trans-
parent communica-
tion 
Transp Assessment of the transparency of government policy. IMD 
Informational open-
ness 
Legmedia Examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content 
and the government’s inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to re-
strict the media’s ability to operate. 
FH 
Polmedia Evaluation of the degree of political control over the content of news media. FH 
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8 PARTICIPATION 
8.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
PARTICIPATION [PARTICIP] 
Equality of participation [PAR_EQPA] Effective participation [PAR_EFPA] 
Suffrage  
[PAR_EQPA1] 
Non-selectivity of electoral participation 
[PAR_EQPA2] 
Suffrage 
Regprovap 
 
Repturnined 
Repturngeag 
Effective institutionalized participation 
[PAR_EFPA2] 
Rules facilitating participation 
[PAR_EFPA1] 
Meanpart 
Facilitat 
Non-selectivity of alternative participation 
[PAR_EQPA3] 
 
Repaltined 
 
Repaltgeag 
Effective non-institutionalized participation 
[PAR_EFPA3] 
 
Petitions 
 
Demons 
 
Regist 
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8.2 PARTICIPATION: DESCRIPTION OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Equality of participa-
tion 
Suffrage Suffrage Extent of universal active suffrage. Paxton et al., 
IPU 
Regprovap Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population.  IDEA 
Non-selectivity of 
electoral participa-
tion 
Repturnined Representative voter turnout in terms of resources (no participation gap in 
terms of education and income). 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Repturngeag Representative voter turnout in terms of gender and age (no participation 
gap). 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Non-selectivity of 
alternative participa-
tion 
Repaltined Representative alternative participation (signing petitions, attending lawful 
demonstrations) in terms of resources (no participation gap). 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Repaltgeag Representative alternative participation ( signing petition and attending lawful 
demonstrations) in terms of gender and age (no participation gap). 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Effective participa-
tion 
Rules facilitating 
participation 
Facilitat Facilitation of electoral participation.  ACE; Blais and 
Dobrzynska 
2007 
Regist Voter registration is not compulsory. ACE, IPU, CON 
Effective institution-
alized participation 
Meanpart Mean participation rate in % of registered electorate in legislative election 
and/or presidential elections (copied to all years) and/or national referenda 
(calculated into mean in corresponding year).  
UCI, IDEA, 
IAEP, C2D 
Effective non-
institutionalized par-
ticipation 
Petitions Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents 
who indicate having signed petitions. 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
Demons Practice of non-institutionalized participation: share of survey respondents 
who indicate having attended lawful demonstrations. 
WVS, LB, AsB, 
AfB 
 
  52 
9 REPRESENTATION 
9.1 CONCEPT TREE 
 
REPRESENTATION 
[REPRES] 
Substantive representation  
[REP_SR] 
Structural possibilities for 
inclusion of preferences 
[REP_SR1] 
Seatperin 
Dirdem 
Womrep 
 
Gallagindex 
 
Polrightwom 
 
Constraints 
 
Descriptive representation 
[REP_DR] 
No legal constraints for 
inclusion of minorities 
[REP_DR1] 
 
Womgov 
 
No distortion [REP_SR2] 
Issuecongr 
Adequate representation of 
women [REP_DR2] 
Effective access to power 
for minorities [REP_DR3] 
Accpowmin 
Poldismin 
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9.2 REPRESENTATION: DESCRIPTIVE OF INDICATORS 
Component Subcomponent Indicator Short Description Source 
Substantive 
representation 
Structural possibilities 
for inclusion of pref-
erences 
Seatperin Number of seats (lower house) per inhabitants.  Keefer; QoG 
Dirdem Opportunities for direct influence on political decisions. Availability of mandatory 
and facultative referenda. 
BANKS, C2D, 
ACE 
No distortion Gallagindex Index of proportionality according to Gallagher (vote-seat congruence). ACEA, AED, 
EEA, IPU, WZB 
Issuecongr Congruence between left-right positions of voters and left-right positions of par-
liamentarians (measured by party positions). 
Manifestos, WVS, 
LB, AsB, AfB 
Descriptive 
representation  
No legal constraints 
for inclusion of minori-
ties 
Polrightwom Measures women’s political rights, including the right to vote, the right to run for 
political office, the right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the 
right to join political parties, and the right to petition government officials. 
CIRI, DAP 
Constraints Measures the existence of constraints regarding passive suffrage. IPU 
Adequate representa-
tion of women 
Womrep Proportion of female representatives in the lower house of parliament in % of all 
seats. 
IPU 
Womgov Proportion of female representatives in the government (incl. ministers) IPU; UNECE 
Effective access to 
power for minorities 
Accpowmin Access to power for minority groups. MAR  
Poldismin Index of political discrimination of minority groups concerning their unequal rep-
resentation. 
MAR 
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Sources:  
ACE ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.  
 http://aceproject.org 
ACEA Adam Carr's Election Archive.  
 http://psephos.adma-carr.net 
AED African Election Database.  
 http://africanelections.tripod.com 
AfB Afrobarometer.  
 http://www.afrobarometer.org 
AHR Annual Human Rights Reports of the U.S. Department of State.  
 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt 
Altman et al. (2009) Altman, David, Juan Pablo Luna, Rafael Piñeiro and Sergio Toro (2009). Partidos y sistemas de partidos en América Latina: 
Aproximaciones desde la encuesta a expertos 2009. Revista de Ciencia Política 29(3): 775-98. 
Altman/Perez-Liñan (2002) Altman, D. and A. Pérez-Liñán (2002). Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Freedom, Competitiveness and Participation in Eight-
een Latin American Countries. Democratization 9(2): 85-100.  
ANU Australian National University.  
 http://www.anu.edu.au 
Armingeon et al. (2010) Armingeon, Klaus, Romana Careja, Sarah Engler, Marlène Gerber, Philipp Leimgruber and Panajotis Potolidis (2010). Compara-
tive Political Data Set III, 1990-2008.  
 http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html 
AsB Asiabarometer.  
 https://www.asiabarometer.org 
Banisar (2006) Banisar, David (2006). Freedom of Information Around the World. A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws. 
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Privacy International Document. 
 http://www.privacyinterntional.org/foi/foisurvey2006.pdf 
BCNTS Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.  
 http://www.databanksinternational.com 
Bischoff (2006) Bischoff, Carina (2006). Political Competition and Contestability – A study of the Barriers to Entry in 21 Democracies. Dissertation. 
University of Mexico (including data file). 
Blais et al. (2007) Blais, André, Agnieszka Dobrzynska and Peter Loewen (2007). Potential impacts of extended advance voting on voter turnout. 
Elections Canada. 
 http://www.elections.ca/res/rec/fra/Potential_Impacts_e.pdf 
Blum (2005) Blum, Roger (2005). Politischer Journalismus in der Schweiz. In: Donges, Patrick (eds.): Politische Kommunikation in der Schweiz. 
Bern: Haupt: 115-30. 
Bowler et al. (2003) Bowler, Shaun, Elisabeth Carter and David M. Farrell (2003). Changing Party Access to Elections. In Democracy Transformed? 
Expanding Political Opportunities in Advanced Industrial Democracies, edited by B. E. Cain, S. E. Scarrow and R. J. Dalton. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 
BPHW Banks' Political Handbooks of the World.  
C2D Centre for Research on Direct Democracy.  
 http://www.c2d.ch 
Casas-Zamora (2005) Casas-Zamora, Kevin (2005). Paying for Democracy: Political finance and state funding for parties. Essex: ECPR press. 
CD Comtrade Database (UN). 
 http://comtrade.un.org 
CDA CentralAmerciaData. 
 http://www.centralamericadata.com/es/article/home/Costa_Rica_y_El_Salvador_sin_Ley_de_Acceso_a_Informacion 
CIA CIA World Factbook.  
CIRI The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.  
  56 
 http://ciri.binghamton.edu/index.asp 
CMP Comparative Manifestos Project Data Set. 
 http://www.wzb.eu/zkd/dsl/Projekte/projekte-manifesto.en.htm 
CoE Council of Europe (1998). Prohibition of political parties and analogous measures report.   
 http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1998/CDL-INF(1998)014-e.asp 
CON Specific constitution of every country.  
 http://confinder.richmond.edu 
Coppedge (1997) Coppedge, Michael (1997). "A Classification of Latin American Political Parties", Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working 
Paper #244. 
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/members/congress-papers/lasa2004/files/CoppedgeMichael.pdf 
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy. UC Irvine.  
 http://www.democ.uci.edu/resources/archive.php 
CSES Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.  
 http://www.cses.org 
CTS United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems.  
 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-of-
Criminal-Justice-Systems.html 
DAP Democracy Assistance Project - Phase II. Steven E. Finkel, Anibal Perez-Liñan, Mitchell A. Seligson and C. Neal Tate 
 http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html 
DPI Database of Political Institutions 2009. Thorsten Beck , Philip E. Keefer, George R. Clarke, Thorsten Beck and Philip E. Keefer . 
Development Research Group. The World Bank.  
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/DPI2009_corrected_April2010.dta 
EEA Essex Election Archive. Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe. 
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 http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/ 
EED European Election Database.  
 http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database 
EFWP Economic Freedom of the World Project. Fraser Institute. 
 http://www.freetheworld.com 
Elklit/Reynolds (2002) Elklit, J. and A. Reynolds (2002). The impact of election administration on the legitimacy of emerging democracies: a new compar-
ative politics research agenda. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 40: 86-119.  
ESS European Social Survey. 
 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
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Geering/Thacker (2004) Geering John and Strom C. Thacker (2004). Political institutions and Corruption: The role of unitarism and parliamentarism. British 
Journal of Political Science 34: 295-330. 
GFS Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM. International Monetary Fund. 
GURN Global Union Research Network.  
 http://www.gurn.info 
HBI Hans-Bredow-Institut.  
 http://www.hans-bredow-institut.de 
HDR Human Development Reports.  
 http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/indicators_table.cfm 
Hug (2001) Hug, Simon (2001): Altering party systems: strategic behavior and the emergence of new political parties in Western democracies. 
Michigan: Ann Arbor (including data file). 
IAEP Institutions and Elections Project Dataset.  
 http://cdp.binghampton.edu/IAEP.htm 
ICRG International Country Risk Guide. 
 http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx 
IDEA-F Political Finance Database. International IDEA. 
 http://www.idea.int/parties/finance/db/ 
IDEA-T Voter turnout. International IDEA. 
 http://www.idea.int/vt 
IEF Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation. 
 http://www.heritage.org/index 
IEFA European health for all database.  
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 4: The impact of the different determinants on the functions and the principles 
 
Individual 
Liberties 
Rule of 
Law 
Public 
Sphere 
Freedom Competi-
tion 
Mutual 
Constraints 
Govern-
mental 
Capability 
Control Transpar-
ency 
Participa-
tion 
Represen-
tation 
Equality 
FIXED EFFECTS             
Constant 
53.2 (4.5)** 67.7 (6.3)** 22.5 (3.7)** 45.8  
(5.3)** 
55.9  
(6.1)** 
38.8  
(4.9)** 
46.3 
(7.2)** 
42.3  
(5.3)** 
-15.8 (5.4)* 70.0 (4.8)** 28.4 (4.2)** 10.2 
(4.3)* 
Economy             
 GDP 
2.7  
(5.2) 
4.6  
(4.9) 
6.0  
(3.0)*  
9.8  
(4.3)* 
7.8 
(6.7) 
-6.5  
(3.8)* 
-5.9  
(7.2) 
-3.5 
(6.0) 
18.5 (5.3)** -1.5  
(4.1) 
11.5 
(4.2)** 
13.2 
(4.1)** 
 Globalization 
12.8 (3.6)** -5.2  
(3.4) 
12.2  
(2.1)** 
7.5  
(3.0)* 
-1.5 
(4.6) 
9.8  
(2.7)** 
4.6 
(5.0) 
2.2 
(4.2) 
16.7 
(3.7)** 
-13.6 
2.9)** 
27.2 
(2.9)** 
16.0 (2.8)** 
Human Development             
 HDI 
16.5  
(7.3)* 
-25.5 
(7.6)**  
-15.3 
(4.7)** 
21.7  
(6.7)** 
-3.7  
(9.7) 
14.9 
(6.0)** 
23.0 
(10.8)* 
22.4 
(8.6)** 
51.1 
(7.9)** 
-2.4  
(6.3) 
5.9 
(6.3) 
31.9 
(6.2)** 
Institutions             
 Presidential System 
1.8  
(2.9) 
-25.9 
(6.2)** 
5.3  
(3.6) 
-8.2  
(5.0)* 
-1.9  
(4.4) 
-1.8  
(4.8) 
-1.9 
(5.7) 
-4.3 
(3.6) 
-6.9 
(4.4) 
-15.8  
(4.5)** 
-1.4  
(3.3) 
-10.7 
(3.7)** 
Controls             
 Age of democracy 
-1.1  
(5.9) 
51.0 
(12.5)** 
7.3  
(7.2) 
25.5 (10.1)* 8.3  
(8.9) 
-11.6  
(9.6) 
8.3 
(11.5) 
-2.9 
(4.7) 
8.4 
(8.9) 
4.2 
(9.0) 
-14.7 
(6.8)* 
0.4 
(7.5) 
 Population 
-4.4  
(9.5) 
-32.4 
(14.2)* 
-3.8  
(8.5) 
2.8  
(12.1) 
19.3 
(13.7) 
22.8 
(11.0)* 
31.9 
(16.6)* 
43.9 
(11.7)** 
-3.1  
(12.5) 
20.6  
(11.1)* 
-10.8 
(9.7) 
-4.2 
(10.1) 
 Protestantism 
8.1  
(4.6)* 
15.4 (10.0) 12.2  
(5.7)* 
19.6  
(8.1)* 
1.4  
(7.0) 
5.3 
(7.6) 
15.7 
(9.1)* 
10.1 
(5.8)* 
13.9 
(7.0)* 
12.7 
(7.2)* 
19.8 
(5.3)** 
20.4 
(5.9)** 
RANDOM EFFECTS             
Time-Level (
2σ ) 50.1  
(2.4)** 
40.4 (1.9)** 15.6 (0.7)** 32.0 (1.5)** 80.7 
(3.8)** 
25.0  
(1.2)** 
92.6 
(4.4)** 
66.5 
(3.2)** 
49.4 (2.3)** 28.4 
(1.3)** 
31.3  
(1.5)** 
28.8 
(1.4)** 
Country-Level (
2
0µσ ) 
88.2 
(17.6)** 
436.1 
(84.9)** 
142.1 
(27.7)** 
284.9 
(55.6)** 
210.3 
(41.7)** 
254.6 
(49.5)** 
537.3 
(70.1)** 
143.2 
(28.3)** 
211.9 
(41.7)** 
224.8 
(43.9)** 
123.9 
(24.4)** 
153.0 
(29.9)** 
MODEL PROPERTIES             
Number of Timepoints (Countries)  944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 944 (53) 
-2loglikelihood 6550.4 6442.5 5536.8 6212.5 7020.1 5984.3 7170.6 6827.5 6583.1 6091.2 6146.8 6083.5 
Note: Not standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets; all independent variables were rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 indicated the highest value of the 
variable. Coefficients indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. All models were calculated with MLwiN, restricted maximum likelihood estimations.* significant at the 
90% level; ** significant at the 99% level.  
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